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COMMENTS ON CLINTON:
RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF NATURAL
LAW IN JOHN MARSHALL'S
JURISPRUDENCE
JAMES W. ELY, JR.*
In his paper, Robert Clinton continues his exploration of the
place of natural law in the constitutional order of the early
republic.1 He offers a challenging account of the Marshall Court's
principles of constitutional interpretation. I concur with his view
that an understanding of Marshall's constitutional decisionmaking benefits from careful historical inquiry. I also share his
unhappiness with the effort of Progressive-era scholars to recast
constitutional history in terms of class conflict.
Still, there is room to question whether Clinton has provided
a convincing assessment of Marshall's jurisprudence. I fear that
he is inviting us on a journey to a fanciful past. Specifically, I
wish to suggest four caveats to Clinton's analysis:
1) He posits that Marshall was heir to a natural law tradition
which found expression in English common law and William
Blackstone. This tradition, we are told, represented a consensus.
But the natural law tradition was more complex and disjointed
than Clinton makes it appear.! Not only did Sir Edward Coke and
Blackstone write more than a century apart and under very
different political circumstances, but Blackstone was more a
synthesizer of different views than a champion of natural law.
Further, at least two prominent American constitutionalists,
Thomas Jefferson 3 and James Wilson,4 emphatically rejected
Underwood Professor of Law and History, Vanderbilt University
School
of Law.
1. See generally ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989); ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, GOD AND MAN IN THE
LAW: THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1997).
2. See generally KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL
PHILOSOPHY FROM GROTIuS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT (1996)

(surveying the array of different natural law theories); see also THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 561-652 (J.H. Burns ed. 1991).
3. DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, 10-11, 47-51 (1994); Julian S. Waterman, Jefferson and
Blackstone's Commentaries, 27 ILL. L. REV. 629, 629-659 (1933).
4. 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 15-20 (James DeWitt

Andrews ed. 1896).
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Blackstone's views as unsuitable for the foundation of a republican
government. In short, the notion that there was a single natural
law tradition that everyone accepted is more asserted than
demonstrated. It would be remarkable indeed if there was ever
any universally accepted understanding of either natural law or of
English courts,
the basis for constitutional interpretation.
moreover, do not exercise judicial review over legislation or
Therefore, Blackstone's
interpret a written constitution.
conception of the judicial function was an imperfect model for
newly independent America.
It follows that the leading decisions of the Marshall Court
cannot be understood solely as a quest to discover some preexisting norms derived from common law. Marshall was always
alert to the political realities of his day and to the instrumental
dimension of judicial decision making. There is an air of unreality
about Clinton's suggestion that Marshall was deciding cases in a
sort of political vacuum.
2) As argued by Clinton, the appropriate use of natural law by
courts rests on a fine distinction. The Marshall Court, he insists,
regarded natural law principles as embodied in the written
Constitution. Thus, it was thought suitable that the Constitution
should be interpreted with reference to natural law. Clinton is
quick to assert that the Marshall Court never relied solely on
natural law in deciding cases, but rather limited itself to applying
natural law principles as they were incorporated in the text of the
Constitution. This strikes me as a thin distinction that does not
amount to much of a real difference. I would suggest that
Marshall and his colleagues simply did not draw a sharp line
between the constitutional text and non-textual natural law
precepts. If the Constitution was fully consonant with natural
law, why should we be surprised that some Marshall Court
decisions relied on natural law 5concepts, regardless of their
express incorporation into the text?

Not only was the Marshall Court prepared to invoke extratextual norms drawn from natural law, but state courts in the
antebellum era began to move in a parallel direction. They
developed the notion that due process placed substantive
restraints on the exercise of legislative power. The emerging
doctrine of substantive due process to safeguard liberty and
property interests was similar to Marshall's recognition of
unenumerated rights.6
5. See generally Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127-1177 (1987).
6. See generally James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and
Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENTARIES
315, 327-342 (1999); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L.
REv. 171, 171-222 (1992).
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3) I confess that I am mystified as to how a centuries-old
consensus understanding about the use of natural law, supposedly
accepted by judges and the public alike, could be so easily hijacked
in the post-Civil War era to serve the goal of economic liberty.
Clinton attributes this development to a cabal of laissez-fairest
attorneys, judges, and politicians. But his explanation leaves
much to be desired. Ironically, Clinton on this point appears to
follow in the path of the very Progressive historians he criticizes.
One doubts that there could have been a meaningful consensus
about the proper role of natural law if its usage could be so
suddenly and inappropriately enlarged. Is a better explanation
that judges in the late nineteenth century built upon the Marshall
Court's use of natural law, and infused natural law principles into
the Due Process Clause? Indeed, arguably there was considerable
continuity between the jurisprudence of the Marshall Court and
the constitutional doctrines promulgated by courts in the late
nineteenth century. Jennifer Nedelsky has cogently observed:
But the notion that property and contract were essential ingredients
of the liberty the Constitution was to protect, was common to
Madison, Marshall, and the twentieth-century advocates of laissezfaire. And the idea that property and contract could define the
legitimate scope of governmental power was a basic component of
constitutionalism from 1787 to 1937. 7
In this connection, I am dubious that Social Darwinism had the impact that
Clinton assigns. It has become an article of faith for some scholars that the
Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century was influenced by the tenets of
Social Darwinism. 8 Yet there is little evidence to sustain this thesis. 9 Indeed,
as Herbert Hovenkamp concluded: "The degree to which Darwinism and
Social Darwinism failed to permeate the thinking of the Supreme Court in
any way is most amazing."' In any event, Social Darwinism has been out of
favor for decades and hardly explains the continued rejection of what Clinton
describes as a one-time accepted convention of constitutional interpretation.
4) Lastly, I would question the rather passive image of the
Marshall Court fashioned by Clinton in this paper and elsewhere.
In fact, Marshall was quite an activist in effectuating the propertyconscious values of the framers, which were enshrined in the
Constitution.1' These rulings were bolstered by an instrumental
7. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 228
(1990).
8. See, e.g., ROBERT GREEN MCCLOsKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN
THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE, 82 (1951).
9. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER,

1888-1910 75-77 (1995).
10. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 99100(1991).
11. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 42-58, 63-68 (2nd ed. 1998).
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understanding of the desirability of protecting property and
national markets as vehicles for economic growth. Charles F.
Hobson, for example, has pointed out that Marshall's dedication to
property rights was based on his conviction "that strong
constitutional protection for property and investment capital
would promote national prosperity."12 One must not lose sight of
the practical dimensions of Marshall's jurisprudence.
These reservations aside, Clinton should be applauded for
tackling a difficult and important topic. He asks a number of
compelling questions about the work of the Marshall Court, and
his thought-provoking treatment will inform and challenge
scholars.

See also Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property
Rights on the Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV.
1135, 1135-1158 (1980).
12. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE RULE OF LAW 75 (1996).

